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Abstract: The Gray Zone represents a space between peaceful state rival-
ries and war. Within this space actors have developed hybrid strategies to 
extend their influence. This concept of conflict is best illustrated by Rus-
sia’s actions in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Gray Zone doctrine leverages 
ambiguity to create an environment in which adversaries are unable to 
make strategic decisions in a timely and confident manner. Cyber Opera-
tions, because of the attribution problem, lend themselves to this kind of 
conflict. This article explores the interactions between the Gray Zone and 
cyber operations and considers questions which NATO must address in 
order to adapt. 
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Introduction  
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 represented a severe challenge to NATO. 
The events that took place in Eastern Ukraine involved a hybrid strategy, which 
relied heavily on ambiguity. Strategists in Moscow used conventional forces, a 
grip on Russian-language media, a loose interpretation of international law, lo-
cal proxies, information operations and cyber operations as tools to operate 
within the gray zone between war and peace. Although what Russia achieved in 
Crimea represented more than peaceful competition between states, it was 
achieved without triggering a large-scale military engagement. 
In 2007 Russia launched another gray zone operation that navigated the 
fine line between war and peace. The denial of service attack that crippled Es-
tonia in April of that year was the result of tensions between the two countries 
boiling over. Russia did not employ an armed response, which would inevitably 
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invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Instead, a new kind of deniable 
operation was used, which lent itself to the gray zone: a cyber operation. 
It is argued throughout this article that cyber operations have and will con-
tinue to be an effective tool for the adversaries of NATO as part of a gray zone 
strategy. The nascent concept of the gray zone will be explored and its relation-
ship with hybrid warfare elucidated. The applicability of cyber operations to 
gray zone strategy will be discussed in terms of the problem of attribution for 
the victim and the advantage deniability affords for the attacker. Finally, three 
challenges NATO faces as a result of cyber operations within the gray zone will 
be presented. Firstly, the challenge ambiguity represents to Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty; secondly, achieving deterrence against limited opera-
tions that erode NATO influence; and finally, how to navigate this new norm of 
conflict that liberal democratic principles prohibit. It is beyond the remit of this 
article to solve these problems; the objective is rather to compel the academic 
community to engage with the challenges of the gray zone and how cyber op-
erations will be assimilated into future strategies. 
The Gray Zone 
The gray zone between war and peace is the primary characteristic of modern 
conflicts. Carl von Clausewitz considers war to be an extension of a duel be-
tween two parties, “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to ful-
fil our will.” 1 For the majority of human history this definition of war was self-
evident. From the Peloponnesian War onwards a state of war involved a known 
adversary with clear political objectives in opposition to one’s own. According 
to General Curtis LeMay, winning wars was simple: “You’ve got to kill people 
and when you kill enough of them, they stop fighting.” 2 Clausewitz’s definition 
of war imbues with unchanging characteristics – war is violent, instrumental 
and political.3 However, recent attention in academia and policymaking (espe-
cially within NATO) to concepts including hybrid wars, ambiguous wars and 
limited wars suggests that the character of war is changing – or at least the 
threats the Alliance faces are becoming less easily defined. 
Of the scholars from multiple disciplines who have engaged with the con-
cept of hybrid warfare over the years,4 Frank Hoffman is perhaps the most 
widely quoted. According to his definition, hybrid warfare is a deviation from 
                                                          
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1982), 101. 
2 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (London: Simon & Schuster, 2012), 
586. 
3 Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (London: Hurst, 2013). 
4 See e.g. Larry R. Jordan, Hybrid War: Is the US Army Ready for the Face of 21st Cen-
tury Warfare, Master’s thesis (US Army Command and General Staff College, 2008); 
Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Reflection on Future War,” Naval War College Review 
61:3 (2008): 61–76; and Russell W. Glenn, All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Se-
cond Lebanon War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012). 
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previous incarnations: “Instead of separate challenges with fundamentally dif-
ferent approaches (conventional, irregular, terrorist), we can expect to face 
competitors who will employ all forms of war and tactics, perhaps simultane-
ously.” 5 The paragon of such doctrine for Hoffman was Hezbollah in the 2006 
Second Lebanon War, during which Hezbollah repelled a vastly superior Israeli 
conventional force through the use of both conventional and unconventional 
tactics.6 Following Hoffman’s interpretation of hybrid threats, the United States 
(US) will more frequently contend with adversaries capable of employing con-
ventional weapons such as anti-tank and cruise missiles and unmanned aerial 
vehicles, while using irregular tactics such as hiding among the civilian popula-
tion and improvised explosive devices. There is limited literature on cyber oper-
ations and their significance within hybrid strategies.7 However, there is a much 
greater discussion surrounding the concept of cyber war as a distinct concept 
that is highly pertinent to the subject of hybrid war and gray zone conflict.8 
Gray zone conflict and hybrid war are not interchangeable concepts. In-
deed, the use of the term “conflict” for the former and “war” for the latter is 
deliberate. The use of “unconventional” and “irregular” tactics is not limited to 
the strict Clausewitzian paradigm of war. The concept of the gray zone seeks to 
encompass operations that fall short of warfare due to intensity, legality or 
(most interestingly) ambiguity. Unconventional tactics can involve information, 
psychological, diplomatic or economic operations outside the definition of 
“warfare” if it is to be used in any meaningful sense. NATO commanders have 
begun to publically express concern over such unconventional threats.9 It is the 
extensive use of unconventional tactics outside of strictly defined wartime that 
has contributed to a crisis in confidence within NATO.10 US Special Operations 
Command is embarking upon a yearlong research project entitled The Gray 
Zone. The project aims to give the US government the tools to understand gray 
zone threats and create effective responses to them. The gray zone is defined 
                                                          
5 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (2009): 
35. 
6 Ibid., 37. 
7 See Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Hakan Gunneriussan, “Hybrid Wars: The 21st 
Century’s New Threats To Global Peace And Security,” Scientia Militaria, South Afri-
can Journal of Military Studies 43:1 (2015): 77–98. 
8 See e.g. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strat-
egy 12:2 (1993): 141–165; Richard A. Clarke, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National 
Security And What To Do About It (New York: HarperCollins, 2010); and Rid, Cyber 
War Will Not Take Place. 
9 John Vandiver, “Breedlove: NATO Must Redefine Responses to Unconventional 
Threats,” Stars and Stripes, 31 July 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/breedlove-
nato-must-redefine-responses-to-unconventional-threats-1.296129 (accessed 23 Jan-
uary 2016). 
10 Peter Apps, “‘Ambiguous Warfare’ Providing NATO with New Challenges,” Reuters, 
21 August 2014, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-nato-summit-
idUKKBN0GL1KA20140821 (accessed 23 January 2016).  
Oliver Fitton, Connections QJ 15, no. 2 (2016): 109-119 
 
 112 
as the region between peace and war, which is not yet fully understood. Ac-
tions undertaken in the gray zone go beyond normal peacetime competition 
but fall short of all-out war.11 
Russian operations in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea had both a hybrid and 
ambiguous character. In 2014 Russia used a combination of conventional mili-
tary forces (for example, amassing on the Russia/Ukraine boarder and naval pa-
trols) and unconventional tactics (for example, “the little green men” and in-
formation dominance attained by leveraging Russian nationalism in East 
Ukraine) to secure the annexation of Crimea. These actions caused alarm 
throughout the Alliance despite Ukraine’s status as a NATO non-member. Engi-
neered uncertainty in Russian action and rhetoric crippled the Alliance’s ability 
to respond and has the potential to do so again should the doctrine be em-
ployed against NATO members in Eastern Europe.12 Whether these tactics were 
new or anchored with historical precedent remains a matter of debate.13 What 
is clear, however, is that NATO is unprepared for gray zone conflict. 
As demonstrated in Eastern Ukraine, ambiguity is a useful tool. Without a 
full picture of validated information, it becomes difficult for a strategist to 
choose the optimal course of action. By allowing ambiguity to feature within 
strategic decisions or by actively inserting ambiguity into strategy, it is possible 
to cloud the vision of enemy. The United Kingdom (UK) employs a policy of de-
liberate ambiguity in its strategic nuclear deterrent. As a result, adversaries of 
the UK are unaware of “when, how and at what scale” 14 the UK government 
would be willing to use nuclear weapons, including whether they would be 
used on a first-strike basis. A clear statement on the planned use of the nuclear 
deterrent would allow adversaries to more clearly calculate their own strate-
gies. Ambiguity within strategic nuclear deterrence allows states to operate 
below the threshold of conflict by not explicitly threatening an individual ad-
versary. It was a balance between known variables and ambiguous strategies 
that maintained stability during the Cold War. 
                                                          
11 United States Special Operations Command, “The Gray Zone,” White paper, 9 
September 2015), 1, http://army.com/sites/army.com/files/Gray%20Zones%20-
%20USSOCOM%20White%20Paper%209%20Sep%202015.pdf (accessed 23 January 
2016). 
12 For further discussion on this topic see House of Commons Defence Committee, To-
wards the next Defence and Security Review: Part Two – NATO (London: House of 
Commons Defence Committee, 2014), and in particular the evidence given to the 
Committee by Sir Bob Russell.  
13 Peter R. Mansoor discusses this debate, which centers on competing definitions of 
“hybrid warfare,” in “Hybrid Warfare in History,” introductory chapter in Hybrid 
Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present, ed. 
Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
14 HM Government, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, December 
2006, Cm 6994, at 18. 
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Gray zone strategy is employed by non-liberal democratic states and au-
thoritarian non-state actors. Such strategy, especially the use of ambiguity, is 
antithetic to societies based upon social pluralism, binding legal principles and 
government accountability. Accountability and transparency are especially 
sought after in public discourse regarding military action following the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 and the publication of the infamous “dodgy dossier.” 15 Such de-
sire was palpable in the UK during the recent debates over intervention in 
Syria. Democratic accountability functions to limit the degree to which gov-
ernments can employ ambiguity. 
Russia, however, is unrestrained by social pluralism and government ac-
countability. Dissent has been met with violence.16 Putin’s administration has a 
strong grip over the majority of the Russian speaking media in the region.17 
Russian decision making is dramatically less transparent than that of NATO 
members. Russia is therefore relatively unrestrained in its ability to employ 
both conventional and unconventional operations against their adversaries. 
Daesh represents freedom of operation to an even greater degree, owing to its 
disregard for international law. In a straightforward Clausewitzian scenario, war 
is clearly understood and established rules of engagement apply. NATO is de-
signed to win these wars. In gray zone conflict it is not clear who the enemy is 
or what their intentions are, forcing liberal democracies to question the legiti-
macy of their responses with much greater scrutiny than non-democratic ac-
tors. Liberal democracies are greatly restrained in situations where autocratic 
states and non-state actors are not. This results in a strategic imbalance that 
threatens and undermines the strategic advantage NATO provides. 
Cyber Operations 
As NATO’s adversaries develop strategies to exploit the gray zone, conventional 
force is likely to be used in new ways and new unconventional tactics will ap-
pear. Some unconventional tactics are likely to be more effective than others. 
Cyber operations represent a developing unconventional approach that can be 
highly effective within gray zone conflict. 
Cyber operations are facilitated by reliance on networked communication. 
They exclusively utilize computer code in order to alter, collect data from or 
deactivate computer systems that have software, hardware and human com-
ponents. Cyber operations cannot be directly violent because computer code 
                                                          
15 The poorly researched and attributed intelligence report that claimed that Iraqi 
weapons of mass destruction could be readied for use within 45 minutes. This dos-
sier was employed by the Blair government to support the argument for military in-
tervention in Iraq in 2003. 
16 For example, the death of Boris Nemtsov in February 2015 and the violent suppres-
sion of members of the music group Pussy Riot during their demonstrations at the 
2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. 
17 Scott Gehlbach, “Reflections on Putin and the Media,” Post-Soviet Affairs 26:1 
(2013): 78. 
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cannot directly damage a human in the same way as kinetic, energy or agent-
based weapons.18 Nevertheless, they have become a notable element of mod-
ern conflict, including being used to shut down nuclear enrichment facilities 19 
and spy on governments.20 In the recent UK National Security Strategy and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, the government committed £1.9 
billion to “protecting the UK from cyber attack and developing … sovereign ca-
pacities in cyber space.” 21 Cyber operations are of particular value in gray zone 
conflict thanks to two key characteristics: inherent problems associated with 
attribution and deniability on the part of the attacker. 
For adversaries who want to make strategic gains without reaching the con-
flict threshold laid down by NATO (Article 5), the idiom “on the Internet no one 
knows you’re a dog” rings particularly true. Anonymity is a central characteris-
tic of activity in cyberspace. Attributing cyber attacks to adversaries (be they 
individuals, non-state actors or nation states) is complex, time consuming and 
challenging. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the resulting verdict of attribution 
will be so certain as to justify a traditional military response. Therefore, the de-
terrence effect that NATO has been so successful in achieving in terms of 
armed conflict in Europe does not apply to cyber operations. Indeed, many 
NATO members have been struck by various forms of cyber attack, most nota-
bly the large-scale denial of service attack against Estonia in 2007.22 
In 2015 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan assessed the attribution problem in 
an attempt to understand its challenges and advise policymakers on a potential 
solution. They concluded that attribution analysis is an art form requiring “skill, 
tools as well as organizational culture: well-run teams, capable individuals, 
hard-earned experiences and often and initial, hard-to-articulate feeling that 
‘something is wrong.’” 23 Further, they warn that attribution is not a binary mat-
ter of possible versus impossible. Rather, attribution can be achieved with var-
ying levels of certainty. Perhaps most importantly, Rid and Buchanan point out 
that attribution is a matter of political will: it depends on the resources that 
governments want to put into tackling it. 
Rid and Buchanan developed a system they call the “Q Model” for attribu-
tion. This model requires three layers of scrutiny including tactical (technical), 
                                                          
18 Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 13. 
19 For further details on the Stuxnet incident see Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu and 
Eric Chien, W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Cupertino, CA: Symantec Corporation, 2011). 
20 For further details on the GhostNet incident see “Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a 
Cyber Espionage Network,” Information Warfare Monitor, 29 March 2009. 
21 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Re-
view 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, November 2015, Cm 9161, at 
40. 
22 Kenneth Geers, “Cyberspace and the Changing Nature of Warfare,” White paper pre-
sented at the 2008 Black Hat Conference, 7.0. 
23 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, “Attributing Cyber Attacks,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 38 (2015): 30. 
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operational and strategic analysis. At the tactical level, technicians identify that 
an attack has taken place and use all the tools at their disposable to understand 
the how of the attack. How did the adversary gain entry to the system and how 
did they create an effect after successful access? This stage of analysis may fo-
cus on tracking Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, observing the adversary’s 
movement around the system in question, reverse engineering of malicious 
code and a host of other technical skills. At the operational level, the technical 
analysis is compiled and assessed alongside other sources of information, such 
as non-technical analysis (possibly signals intelligence and human intelligence), 
analysis of similar attacks and the wider geopolitical context to create hypothe-
ses about what happened – the what of the attack. Finally, the strategic layer 
attempts to understand the who and the why of the attack. At this point, deci-
sion-makers consider the operational hypotheses, debate who may be respon-
sible and formulate a response based on the attack’s significance. The final as-
pect of the Q Model is to communicate attribution to the wider community. 
However, this model does not solve the problem of attribution. Advanced 
adversaries will still be able to obfuscate their role in cyber operations to a cer-
tain degree, most likely by pointing the finger at another actor. This can be 
achieved with the use of a certain language or skillful placement of what ap-
pear to be coding mistakes. Rid and Buchanan point out that “The perfect cyber 
attack is as elusive as the perfect crime.” 24 However, adversaries in hybrid war 
do not need to achieve the perfect unattributable cyber attack; they simply 
need to cause enough doubt in the minds of analysts to limit or slow policy-
maker’s responses. 
The second characteristic of cyber operations that is particularly important 
to understand in the context of hybrid strategies is deniability. There is an in-
creasing trend towards deniable partnerships between states and cyber opera-
tions specialist groups, which insulates the state from blame for disruptive un-
conventional campaigns. During the early stages of the civil war in Syria, Presi-
dent Bashir Al-Assad’s regime developed an ambiguous relationship with a 
group called the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA). The SEA was a pro-Assad move-
ment that hacked into Western websites and social media accounts, defacing 
them and spreading pro-Assad messages. High-profile targets included the On-
ion, the Associated Press (AP) and Harvard University.25 However, the SEA was 
not Assad’s personal cyber army, and their relationship was often publically 
strained.26 As a result, Assad could plausibly deny that his regime was responsi-
                                                          
24 Ibid., 32. 
25 For further discussion of the activities of the Syrian Electronic Army and its attacks 
see Oliver Fitton and Mark Lacy, “The Syrian Electronic Army Is Rewriting the Rules 
of War,” The Conversation, 3 September 2013, http://theconversation.com/the-
syrian-electronic-army-is-rewriting-the-rules-of-war-17618 (23 January 2016). 
26 Adam Jones, “Syrian Electronic Army Turns on Assad Regime,” Seczine: Security 
Magazine, 21 August 2013, http://seczine.com/cyber-security/2013/08/syrian-elec-
tronic-army-turns-on-assad-regime/ (accessed 23 January 2016).  
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ble for defacing Western websites and stealing data from US institutions while 
benefiting from the tactical success of the SEA. It has been suggested that Rus-
sia used the very same model to carry out cyber attacks on the Georgian gov-
ernment in 2008 and Estonian financial institutions in 2007 through the organi-
zation known as the Russian Business Network (RBN).27 
Cyber operations are difficult to attribute and in some cases deniable even 
if a degree of attribution is possible. They also have the potential to be ex-
tremely dangerous. While computer code will never kill a human being directly, 
it is highly likely that cyber attacks on industrial or societal infrastructure will 
one day result in death. For example, in 2006 the Aurora experiment demon-
strated that code-based exploits can result in kinetic effects,28 and in 2010 the 
Stuxnet worm proved to be behind the malfunctions of centrifuges at the Na-
tanz nuclear facility in Iran. The potential for both ambiguity and effectiveness 
means that cyber operations are very likely to be employed by gray zone ad-
versaries in the future as they have been in the recent past. 
Challenges for NATO 
NATO recognizes that hybrid warfare is a strategy it must come to understand 
and learn to combat. NATO must take special notice of the role that cyber op-
erations play within hybrid strategies with special emphasis on their ambiguous 
nature. Three specific challenges are apparent. First, there is the question of 
how to apply Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the case of a cyber attack 
on a NATO member state if attribution is not a binary proposition. Second, if at-
tribution and deniability restrain NATO’s use of force, the Alliance must find a 
way to deter adversaries from the use of low-intensity tactics, such as those 
employed in Estonia, Georgia and Eastern Ukraine. Finally, it remains to be 
seen whether NATO can employ cyber operations as part of a gray zone strat-
egy while respecting the liberal democratic principles that separate the Alliance 
from its adversaries. In other words, it would be wise for NATO to engage in 
gray zone strategies. 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “an armed attack against 
one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all.” As such, the Alliance will take “action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area.” 29 The first problem with Article 5 regarding cyber attacks 
is the debate around the degree to which cyber attacks represent an “armed 
                                                          
27 Joseph Menn, Fatal System Error: The Hunt for the New Crime Lords Who Are Bring-
ing Down the Internet (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 212–213. 
28 Fortinet, “Securing SCADA Infrastructure,” White paper (Sunnyvale, CA: Fortinet, 
2010), 6. 
29 “The Atlantic Charter,” last modified 1 October 2009, available at www.nato.int/cps/ 
bu/natohq/official_texts_16912.htm. 
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attack.” 30 If cyber attacks cannot be considered violent 31 there must be debate 
over their status as “armed attacks”. If a cyber attack is not considered to be an 
armed attack, such an event does not automatically trigger the process of col-
lective response on which European security has been based since the end of 
the Second World War. However, this view has been challenged in the wake of 
the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stolten-
berg confirmed that NATO deems cyber attacks within the spirit of the re-
quirements for action based upon Article 5 commitments.32 This echoes the 
unilateral stance taken by the United States.33 
The next question associated with this first challenge is how to justify a mili-
tary response to a cyber attack invoking Article 5 when the process of attribu-
tion (as described by Rid and Buchanan) requires time, investment and a multi-
layered approach in order to produce a conclusion that is unlikely to be one 
hundred percent certain. Even if the legality of an armed response to a cyber 
attack is agreed upon, the confidence of NATO commanders in their actions 
must be based on the fallible science of attribution. Moreover, it will be diffi-
cult for NATO to react decisively if the adversary suspected of carrying out a 
cyber attack has a degree of built-in deniability, such as those between Russia 
and the RBN or Assad’s regime in Syria and the SEA. Were cyber operations to 
take place alongside clear conventional military operations (as seen in Georgia 
in 2008), actions based on Article 5 would be clearly justified. If cyber opera-
tions were to precede the use of conventional tactics within a hybrid strategy, 
NATO may find itself constrained, divided and unable to act decisively as a re-
sult of an adversary engineering uncertainty through plausible deniability. 
The second challenge NATO must overcome is how to deter cyber opera-
tions against NATO members. The full extent of a nation state’s cyber capability 
is necessarily a matter of ambiguity. Should specific capabilities be revealed, 
the exploits upon which they are based are liable to be fixed and that capability 
rendered useless. This is a fundamentally different challenge compared to con-
ventional and nuclear deterrence. While cyber operations may never be com-
parable to conventional or nuclear warfare to the extent that they represent an 
existential threat to a nation-state, it is likely that they may be used to destabi-
lize societies, economies and populations within the sphere of influence of an 
adversary as part of a wider hybrid doctrine. Such destabilization may contrib-
                                                          
30 Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3. 
31 See Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place. 
32 Paul McLeary, “NATO Chief: Cyber Can Trigger Article 5,” Defense News, 25 March 
2015, available at www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/ 
2015/03/25/nato-cyber-russia-exercises/70427930 (accessed 23 January 2016).  
33 Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, “Cyber Combat: Act of War,” The Wall Street 
Journal, 31 May 2011, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270 
2304563104576355623135782718 (accessed 23 January 2016).  
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ute to the erosion of NATO’s influence and ability to secure its strategic objec-
tives. 
The final challenge relates to how NATO’s liberal democratic principles re-
strain it from employing the same tactics used by its adversaries, despite the 
opportunity to do so, and to achieve strategic success. NATO members, in par-
ticular the US and UK, have some of the largest investments in cyber opera-
tions. However, they are the nations that will be the most constrained from 
using such unconventional tactics openly. Liberal democratic principles includ-
ing the rule of law, government accountability and transparency should restrict 
these states from employing their unconventional operations during peace-
time. As a result, NATO is at risk of being left in a doctrinal deficit more difficult 
to overcome than any technology gap. NATO’s adversaries are thus able to take 
advantage of the gray zone between war and peace: Daesh can gain territory 
while spreading fear and its radical message and Russia is able to make territo-
rial and psychological gains in Eastern Europe, while NATO itself is philosophi-
cally bound to uphold strict virtues. As a result, NATO stands to have its influ-
ence eroded while being unable to play the very game it is losing. 
Nevertheless, pragmatism may inevitably come before virtue. Russia has 
long accused the West of using the very ambiguous strategies that Western ac-
ademia now recognizes Russia to be employing.34 According to Timothy L 
Thomas, Russian scholars have long viewed the Soviet defeat to be the result of 
a clandestine information war.35 There are question marks around how sustain-
able such a doctrine might be in the modern age. It is entirely possible that 
NATO members could create deniable relationships with online non-state 
actors in order to achieve the kinds of deniable partnerships that have been 
enjoyed by Assad and Putin. Indeed, this may be easier for liberal democratic 
states. The principles of many online groups often include liberty, equality and 
positivism, if not rule of law. However, any evidence of such partnership is 
likely to cause some tension between populations and governments in a post 
Wiki-leaks world. Furthermore, the deniability enjoyed by adversaries comes at 
the cost of command and control, which can lead to unintended consequences 
for highly networked societies. As a result, deniable partnerships are unlikely to 
be appealing in a NATO gray zone strategy. 
Conclusion 
Gray zone conflict marks an extension of hybrid warfare into the space be-
tween war and peace. It employs both conventional and unconventional meth-
ods to achieve political goals, as well as ambiguity to cloud the judgement of 
adversaries. Cyber operations are an unconventional tactic that has been and 
                                                          
34 Timothy L. Thomas, “Nation-State Cyber Strategies: Examples from China and Rus-
sia,” in Cyberpower and National Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and 
Larry K. Wentz (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2009), 486. 
35 Ibid., 477. 
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will continue to be used in gray zone approaches by NATO’s adversaries. Issues 
surrounding the attribution of cyber operations and engineered deniability on 
the part of adversaries drastically restrain NATO’s ability to respond to cyber 
operations. It is vital that NATO develop a means by which to respond and 
deter such tactics, not only because of the damage cyber attacks might cause, 
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